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This paper illustrates the measurement and the applications of the observable, entropy production
rate (EPR), in human subject social interaction systems. To this end, we show (1) how to test the
minimax randomization model with experimental 2×2 games data and with the Wimbledon Tennis
data; (2) how to identify the Edgeworth price cycle in experimental market data; and (3) the
relationship within EPR and motion in data. As a result, in human subject social interaction
systems, EPR can be measured practically and can be employed to test models and to search for
facts efficiently.
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INTRODUCTION
Laboratory experiment in human subject social inter-
action systems (HSSIS) has becoming major tool for fun-
damentally social science [1, 2], in which developing sig-
nature observable is meaningful.
Entropy and entropy production rate (EPR), a twin
observable, correspond to the diversity and the activity
of a system [3, 4], respectively. In game theory for HSSIS,
entropy has been noticed theoretically [5] and experimen-
tally [6, 7]. Denoting the density of state (DOS) as Pi
for state i (i ∈ X and X:= {1, 2, ..., r} is the full social
strategy set), the entropy S is as [6],
S = −
∑
i
Pi logr Pi. (1)
In games, entropy can identify the distribution in X and
the diversity of HSSIS [6, 7]. EPR serves as a central
observable for the activity of many natural systems [3],
however, in HSSIS, EPR has never been reported empir-
ically; Developing EPR as an observable in HSSIS is the
main aim of this letter.
As the discrete Markov chains can be obtained [8, 9] in
HSSIS, the metric for EPR could borrow from physics [3,
10, 11]. For a system with small number of states and
lasting time long enough, the stationary state approxima-
tion can be considered [12]; the associated mean entropy
production rate S˙ (EPR) is as [3, 10, 13, 14]
S˙ =
1
2
∑
i,j
[Piωij − Pjωji] logr
[
Piωij
Pjωji
]
, (2)
in which Pi is the DOS and ωij is the transition proba-
bility from state i to j. Fig. 1(c) is an empirical example
for Pi, ωij and a Markovian.
∗Corresponding author. This manuscript is modified from its early
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FIG. 1: (a, b) a payoff matrix and the strategy space X (2×2
game, Trt. 31 in Table I); (c) a Markovian with ωij and Pi
(from top-left subtable in Table 1 in ref. [8], also Trt. 48 in
Table I); in (c), the entropy is 0.9952 and the EPR is 0.0481.
TABLE I: Empirical Data from HSSIS
Game Trt.a States Rec./Trt. Ref.
2×2 31-40 4 4500 [18]
2×2 41 4 ∼3600 MP4
WT(2×2) 45-47 4 ∼2000 [15]
EC 48-55 4 ∼200 [8]
HS(2×2) 56-57 4 2600 [16]
aTrt.: Treatment, S.: Session, Rec./Trt.: Records in per treat-
ment, 2×2: the 2×2 games, WT: Wimbledon Tennis [15], EC:
Edgeworth Cycle [8], HS: a laboratory 2×2 game [16] and MP4:
our laboratory experiment with 12 sessions 300 rounds fixed
paired 2-person matching pennies game with payoff matrix as
[5, 0; 0, 5; 0, 5; 5, 0] as [17]. Notices that, WT data is not an ex-
perimental economics (EE) data but records of Tennis game.
The data is collected from the published 24 experimen-
tal economics treatments (EET) listed in Table I. All of
the 24 EET, the state number (r) is 4. Each of the EET
is of an unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and of
long rounds satisfying the stationary approximation [12].
These are practically the simplest systems for EPR [54].
For more details, see Appendix.
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2To demonstrate the EPR’s applications, the paper is
as follows, (1) testing an economics model with EPR; (2)
detecting an economics phenomena with EPR; and (3)
verifying a relationship within two dynamical variables
with EPR; Then, summary last.
EPR AND RADOMIZATION IN MINIMAX
The von Neumann’s Minimax model (vNM) ’repre-
sents game theory in its most elegant form: simple but
with stark predictions’ [19]. In vNM, playing mixed strat-
egy game ’against an at least moderately intelligent op-
ponent’, should be ’playing irregularly heads and tails in
successive games’ (the randomization prediction), except
that the possibility of a strategy used is constrained. The
randomization prediction of vNM is tested with EPR.
In Fig. 2, the entropy and EPR from the 16 EET of
the 2×2 games (Trt. 31-41, 45-47 and 56-57) are shown
(in • or N).
The vNM randomization predictions can be realized
directly with simple Monte Carlo simulation (MCs) [20].
We conduct the MCs 104 times for each of the 16 EET,
respectively; For a MCs, there are two constrains: First,
holds the same sample size of sessions, rounds and agents
as its related EET; Second, holds the same mean strategy
possibility as its related EET [55]. As results of the vNM
randomization prediction, the entropy and EPR [56] are
shown (in ◦ or M) in Fig. 2.
Comparing entropy and EPR values from the vNM and
from the HSSIS respectively, we have (1) the vNM can
not be rejected with the entropy comparison [57]; But,
(2) the EPR values from HSSIS is significant larger than
that from vNM (p<0.001, 16 samples, t−test [58]). With
EPR, the randomization prediction of vNM have to be
rejected.
It is an example of testing a behavior model with EPR.
EPR AND EDGEWORTH CYCLE
Many years ago, Edgeworth predicted persistent price
cycles phenomena in a competitive situation where the
only equilibrium is in mixed strategies [21, 22]. It is very
puzzling because it seemingly contradicts the law of one
price of elementary microeconomics [23]. The cycles, e.g.,
in retail gasoline markets [24], have been obtained in real
economies; meanwhile, the welfare effects of the cycles
have been found [25]. Usually, detecting the cycle is un-
easy [8, 21].
In a stationary state, if the EPR systematically devi-
ates from zero, there must be balanced cycle fluxes, and
this is a simple consequence of Kirchhoff’s Law [10, 26].
Meanwhile, in a finite dataset, as Trt. 48-55, the obtained
EPR can be the bias from finite sample (e.g., [27]). To
correct the bias, we use the EPR from repeated MCs as
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FIG. 2: Obtained entropy (in horizon) and and EPR (in ver-
tical) in the 2×2 games. Experimental results of the Trt. ID
in Table I labels in solid. The result of mean entropy and
EPR from the 104 times vNMs are in hole and labeled start
with ’S’ and the Trt. ID.
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FIG. 3: EPR in the price dispersion market game from the
data of the laboratory experiments (solid bar) and Monte
Carlo simulations (blank bar, mean value of B0i , 10
4 times
repeated, see text), respectively.
base line zero (denoted as B0). So the existence of a cycle
in a EET can be simplified to a sharp testable hypoth-
esis (H0): for the i-th EET, the empirical EPRi equals
to the B0i .
In Fig. 3, each of the empirical EPRi of the 8 EET (Trt.
48-55) is shown in solid bar and the B0i is in blank bar.
Each B0i comes from the MCs with the constraint of the
price distribution from the Markovian and the number of
rounds as its related EET. As a result, in 7 EET (except
Trt. 50), the empirical EPRi is larger significant than its
B0i (p < 0.001) [59]. So, the existence of Edgeworth cycle
in each of the 7 EET can be supported efficiently [60].
It is an example of detecting an economic phenomena
with EPR.
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FIG. 4: Empirical relationship of the motion (M) and EPR
in the EET of the 2×2 games. Labels relate to the Trt. ID
in Table I
EPR AND MOTION
In evolutionary game theory, an evolutionary dynamic
equation describes the velocity of evolution in space
X [28–31]. Experimental economics is a test bed for
evolutionary game theory [8, 32–38], and recently the
velocity patterns in strategy space are observed [17, 39].
As both of the observables, the velocity in Eq.(4) and
the EPR in Eq.(2), describe the time reversal asymme-
try processes of experimental social dynamics [4, 39–41],
the relationship within them is natural concerned.
Fig. 4 is the scattering of the motion (M) and EPR
of the 16 EET (Trt. 31-41, 45-47 and 56-57, the 2×2
games). Here, the motion (M) is defined as,
M =
1
2
∑
iα
Piv
2
iα, (3)
in which, Pi is the DOS of i (i ∈ S) and α denotes the two
dimensions of movements in a two-population 2×2 games
as in Fig. 1(b). The velocity [17, 39], viα, in Markovian
format is
viα =
∑
j
[(Pjωji − Piωij)(xiα − xjα)] , (4)
in which xiα is the vector of the α companion of the i
state in Euclidean X [17, 39]. Denoting the EPR as P ,
the simple linear fit (OLE) results: M=(0.064±0.003)P
+ 0.000 and R2 = 0.97 for the 16 EET.
As an empirical finding, the motion (M) is positive
and linear dependent on the EPR in the data.
SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
There is no reason that the approach to predicting the
behavior of physical systems is not appropriate when the
physical system in question is some human beings play-
ing a game [42]. EPR is one of the key signatures of
non-equilibrium steady (stationary) states [4] and we link
EPR to the stationary state [12] of HSSIS. The potential
advantage of the EPR observable should be:
(1) At speaking to theorists [43]: The EPR could serve
as an independent variable to test behavior models. For
example, testing the randomization prediction of vNM is
hard [19, 36, 44–48], as we have shown above, EPR is
effective for the task. Whether models [12, 49] can be
verified with EPR is becoming a question.
(2) At searching for facts [43]: (a) EPR could serve as
a variable to detect the heterogeneous of behavior, e.g. in
Wimbledon Tennis [15], the EPR in the juniors, females
and males are significant different. (b) the EPR could
detect the dynamical pattern. With the time reversal
symmetry (asymmetry) consideration, unifying themes
for the phenomena like Edgeworth cycle, Shapley poly-
gon [50], and the Scarf price dynamics on Walrasian gen-
eral equilibrium [51, 52] can be expected.
(3) At Bridging between physics and economics: Since
1990s [53], the physics near stationary (or steady, equi-
librium) state is becoming fruitful [4, 10, 11, 13, 14]. This
paper is benefit from the physics. Meanwhile, the empir-
ical results of EPR and the methods here could feedback
to the developing physics, e.g., to verify the relations of
the observable (and variables). In social dynamics [41],
with dynamical observable likes EPR, excellent develop-
ments could be expected.
In summary, firstly and empirically in HSSIS, this pa-
per has illustrated function of the observable, EPR, on
models testing and facts finding, which could benefit to
the both, physics and economics.
Our outlook is, as in physics, EPR can be a signa-
ture observable in the human subject social interaction
systems.
Notes: We thanks Ken Binmore and Al Roth for help-
ful discussion and the data providing. The programmes
for the Monte Carlo simulations and statistical analysis,
the primary data set and the instructions of our labora-
tory experiment MP4 in Table I are available from the
authors website.
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